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TAXATION - FEDERAL INCOME TAX- FULL PAYMENT A PREREQUISITE TO
REFUND SUIT - A tax deficiency of $28,908.60 including interest was levied
by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against the petitioner for a single
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tax year. Petitioner paid $5,058.54 but later filed a claim for refundl which
was disallowed by the Commissioner. On suit by petitioner in a United
States district court for the refund,2 the court held the petitioner was not
entitled to the refund because the claimed losses were actually capital in
nature.3 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and dismissed
the complaint on the ground that the district court could not have jurisdiction until there had been full payment of the assessed deficiency.4 On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, one justice
dissenting.5 On rehearing, 6 held, affirmed, four justices dissenting.7 Congress has erected a comprehensive structure of tax procedure premised upon
the general understanding that full payment was a prerequisite to a refund;
to rule otherwise now would produce disharmony within this structure and
would obstruct tax collection. Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145 (1960).
Whether full payment of an assessed deficiency is required before a district court has jurisdiction of a refund suit is dependent upon the construction of the controlling jurisdictional statute. This statute states:
"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction ... of ... any
civil action against the United States for the recovery of any internalrevenue tax alleged to have been erroneously . . . collected, or any
penalty claimed to have been collected without authority or any sum
alleged to have been excessive or in any manner wrongfully collected
under the internal-revenue laws...." 8
Since no penalty was involved here, the questions raised are whether
"tax" refers only to the full amount assessed and whether the meaning of
"any sum" precludes the argument that the payment of part of the assessed
tax could be regarded as the payment of "any sum."9
lFiling such a claim is a prerequisite to suit. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §7422(a).
2 Suit was brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1346 (a) (I) (1958).
3 Flora v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 602 (D.C. Wyo. 1956).
4 Flora v. United States, 246 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1957).
5 Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63 (1958).
6 The rehearing was granted in Flora v. United States, 360 U.S. 922
7 Justices Whittaker, Frankfurter, Harlan and Stewart dissented.

(1959).
They argued, int~r
alia, that enough cases had allowed a refund suit without questioning the fact of partial
payment to preclude a finding of general understanding that full payment was required,
and that allowing partial payment would not produce significant disharmony within the
present collection system.
s 28 U.S.C. §1346 (a) (I) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
9 The majority believed that "any sum" referred to amounts, such as interest, which
were neither taxes nor penalty. The lower federal courts were split on this question. Full
payment was not required in some district court cases brought at a time when the unpaid
assessment could be concurrently litigated before the Board of Tax Appeals. Brampton
Woolen Co. v. Field, 55 F.2d 325 (D.C. N.H. 1931) (ultimately decided in the govern•
ment's favor on another jurisdictional ground); Emery v. United States, 27 F.2d 992 (W.D.
Pa. 1928); Old Colony R.R. v. United States, 27 F.2d 994 (D.C. Mass. 1928). Full payment
was expressly not required in Bushmiaer v. United States, 230 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1956);
Hanchett v. Shaughnessy, 126 F. Supp. 769 (N.D. N.Y. 1954); Sirian Lamp Co. v. Manning,
123 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1941); Coates v. United States, 111 F.2d 609 (2d Cir. 1940). Full
payment was required in Rogers v. United States, 155 F. Supp. 409 (E.D. N.Y. 1957); Suhr
v. United States, 18 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1927).
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This phraseology first appeared not in a jurisdictional provision but in
a statute of limitation10 concerned with the time for the initiation of a
refund suit against the collector. The meaning of the disputed language is
not illuminated by committee reports, for there were none at that time, nor
by the congressional debates.11 Thus, in the absence of any persuasive
judicial interpretation12 contemporary with its enactment, it was reasonable
for the Court in interpreting this language to give weight to the fact that
Congress had subsequently erected a comprehensive tax collection procedure
which apparently assumed that full payment was required in order to obtain
jurisdiction in a district court. For example, the primary motivation for
the creation of the Board of Tax Appeals appears to have been the desire to
relieve a taxpayer of the hardships which resulted from requiring full
payment before permitting litigation of the correctness of the assessment.13
Furthermore, the Declaratory Judgment Act was amended to exclude tax
disputes in order to preserve the principle of "pay first and litigate later."14
To allow part payment would, in effect, permit the taxpayer to circumvent
this exclusion by paying $5.00 on a $1,000.00 assessment and then litigating
the assessment in a district court.
In addition to wishing to prohibit part payment when it was apparent
that later legislators intended a requirement of full payment, the Court was
also of the view that to allow part payment now would disrupt the efficient
operation of existing tax laws.1 5 It was feared that permitting partial payment might force widespread exercise of the discretionary power of distraint10 to collect the tax assessed and that the public indignation resulting
from subjection to this treatment might operate to destroy the present

10 17 Stat. 257 (1872).
11 For reference to the complete congressional debates on the bill encompassing this
provision, see CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. at lvi, cxcii (1872) (bill H.R. 2322).
12The Court did argue that dictum in Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875)a case involving a refund suit against the collector initiated under the 1866 claim for
refund requirement, 14 Stat. 152, which required suit to be brought within six to twelve
months after the claim arose - constituted authoritative interpretation of the disputed
language. However, it was after that suit was begun, though before decision, that the
statute of limitations was passed which initiated this disputed language. This latter statute
provided a two-year limitation. Supra note IO. This dictum relied upon describes the tax
procedures at that time, but it indicates no cognizance of the change in limitation; indeed,
the dictum alludes to an "appeal," which was the terminology for the six to twelve months
limitations.
13 43 Stat. 336 (1924). See H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1924); S. REP. No.
!198, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1924); 65 CONG. R.Ec. 2621, 2689, 8IIO (1924); 67 CONG. R.Ec.
525, II44, 3529, 3755 (1925-1926). There is also some suggestion that this tribunal was
created to obviate the anti-injunction provision now found in INT. REV. CoDE OF 1954,
§7421. See principal case at 158.
14 48 Stat. 955 (1934), amended by 49 Stat. 1027 (1935), as amended, 28 U .S.C. §§2201,
2202 (1958). See S. REP. No. 1240, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1935); principal case at 164.
15 Principal case at 160, I 76.
16 INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, §6331 provides for the seizure and sale of taxpayer's prop•
erty for failure to pay the tax within ten days of notice and demand. This power is not
available during Tax Court litigation. See note 18 infra.
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practice of voluntary payment and assessment.1 7 On the other hand, it was
argued by the dissent that any delay in payment resulting from part payment suits should not necessitate exercise of the distraint power, for there
is also delay in collection when the taxpayer litigates in the Tax Court.1 8
While this will remain a speculative issue, it should be noted that there
would probably be more delay with a district court disposition due to
clogged dockets.19 Moreover, a multiplication of such delay would be likely
because the allowance of partial payment suits might induce many taxpayers to litigate in the district courts in order to take advantage not only
of the longer limitation period applicable to refund suits20 but also of what
many practitioners apparently believe to be the more favorable treatment
afforded taxpayers in the district courts.21 While such delay might not be
enough to force the exercise of the distraint power, it would at least contribute to lesser efficiency in tax collection. Also, part payment could necessitate making an investigation in each case in order to decide whether the
financial condition and integrity of the particular taxpayer made it advisable to exercise the power of distraint. Thus, more man-hours might be
required to collect the same amount of tax dollars.
The only significant positive argument in favor of permitting part
payment is premised upon the belief that a full payment requirement will
work hardships on some taxpayers.22 Nevertheless, in view of the maniJ.7 Principal case at 176.
18 Principal case at 194. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §6213 (a) prevents assessments or
collections until the Tax Court reaches a final decision and any appeals are final. The
total amount of refund suits pending as of June 30, 1959, was $500,619,000; as of the same
date the Tax Court had before it, not subject to immediate collection, $810,057,000 in tax
deficiencies, $108,515,000 in penalties and $640,664,000 in overpayments. 1959 Coim'R. INT.
REv. ANN. REP. 128, 130, tables 17, 20.
19 It appears that in the more congested centers, at least, the district court is a slower
tribunal than the Tax Court. Emmanuel, Federal Tax Refund Procedure, 5 Fu. L. REv.
133, 136 (1952).

20 In refund suits, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6511 (a) provides a limitation on filing the
claim for refund of 3 years from the time the return was due, or 2 years from the time
the tax was paid, whichever is greater; this is followed by a two-year statute of limitation
on suit in the district court. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §6532 (a) (1). In comparison, following the notice of deficiency, the ta.xpayer has only 90 days within which to bring suit in
the Tax Court. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §6213 (a).
21 See Dockery, Refund Suits in District Courts, 31 TAXES 523 (1953).
22 See "Morrison Lecture" of Dean Griswold, Mass. L.Q., Oct. 1958, pp. 98, 109; also
3 RABKIN AND JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §72.04 (6) (1956).
Full payment can produce hardships for the taxpayer who, through ignorance of the consequences, does not file suit before the Tax Court in time and who does not have the
resources to make full payment. There are also hardships for taxpayers who are not able
to determine within 90 days if they will have enough assets to cover the assessment when
the assets are liquidated, or the taxpayer who chooses to sue for refund and starts liquidating only to find, more than 90 days later, that his assets are not marketable or that the
market value is substantially less than anticipated. One answer to these hardships is that
they could have been avoided by going to the Tax Court and that when he elects to sue
for a refund these are the risks which he knowingly undertakes. Full payment also creates
hardships for those taxpayers who do not have recourse to the Tax Court and so must
pay the full assessment if they ever wish to challenge the correctness and legality of the
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fested congressional intent, the additional administrative problems, and the
absence of persuasive proof of widespread, substantial hardships incident
to full payment, the Court's decision is a reasonable one. However, this
decision does indicate that it is time for Congress to consider in depth and
detail the extent of hardship caused by requiring full payment and to ponder
whether some statutory relief is appropriate.
Stuart S. Gunckel

1 CAL. UNEMP. INs. ConE §1262 states: "An individual is not eligible for unemployment
compensation benefits, and no such benefits shall be payable to him, if he left his work
because of a trade dispute."

